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INTRODUCTION

SYNCHRONIZATION~A SHARED RESPONSIBILITY
ENDS-WAYS-MEANS
U. S. Army Field Manual 100-5, Operations defines synchronization as:
"... the arrangement of battlefield activities in time, space and purpose to produce maximum relative combat power at the decisive point." 2 Commanders use variants of the decide-detect-deliver methodology to integrate the seven BOSs to achieve synergism and focused combat power. Doctrinally, it is combined arms commander's responsibility to "think operating systems," and direct maneuver and fires with a total force perspective to achieve synchronization. 
ENDS --WAYS --MEANS
ATK HELOS MORTARS
DOCTRINE -ORGANIZATION DISCONNECT
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Understanding the "complementary-not competing" roles and capability of these two combatants is essential for resolution of many fire and maneuver synchronization problems.
Even the technique of co-locating forward observer parties (available in mechanized infantry battalions only) with scout sections has had very limited success. Too often, the scout's principal reconnaissance mission requirements to find the enemy, his barriers, the best routes to the objective, or to observe a given Named Area of Interest (NAI) takes priority over the indirect fire requirements.
Consequently, observers are not positioned to perform their targeting duties, because they must rely on the scout section for communication, mobility and survivability.
In summary, primarily because of artillery force structure limitations, the success or failure of the fire support system is contingent upon how well maneuver forces perform fire support functions as an additional duty. The current fire support structure simply does not provide sufficient numbers of trained eyes to execute the commander's "event driven" fire plans. Until the Artillery aligns doctrine with capability by fully resourcing the "eyes" requirement with COLTs, synchronization and effective "Fighting with Fires"
at TF/Bde levels will remain an elusive goal.
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THE COMMAND AND CONTROL CHALLENGE THE FSO-A STAFF PLANNER. FIRE CO«TBnjT.KR QR BOTH
As evidenced by the amount of emphasis on planning (67 pages) as opposed to execution (12 pages) in FM 6-20-40, the brigade fire support organization is designed and equipped to primarily perform fire planning functions. But doctrinally, the FSEs are also required to coordinate, clear and control fires, while the TF FSOs accompany their commanders forward on the battlefield. This is a "tall order" even for the best FSE and FSO. In fact, with the current FSE manning and equipment capability, this is an unrealistic expectation.
CONTROLLING THE OPTEMPO
COLTs, when employed in concert with scouts, provide the TF and Bde targeting triad (S-3/S-2/FS0) the capability to not only provide top-down fire planning guidance, but also the means to "integrate and control" execution of the commander's reconnaissance and targeting efforts. Jointly, the S-2 and FSO work the critical communication links between the sources of acquisition (jcDut/COLT), maneuver commanders, and the artillery unit that will fire the mission. Unlike counterfire missions which rely on FIREFINDER radars for target acquisitions, commanders prosecuting the "close fight" must rely on visual acquisition sources (COLTs and scouts).
THE TASK FORCE FSO'S PLACE OF DOTY
Because the TF FSO is directly clearing and prioritizing 
FSE'S CRITICAL FIRE CONTROL HUBS
BDE CDR FSCOORD COLTS
CENTRALIZED COMMAND AND CONTROL ARCHITECTURE
Emerson Electric
Company's unsolicited operational analysis in support of CSSG IV, titled "Resource Trade-offs to Increase Force Effectiveness of Supporting Fires for the Maneuver Company", October 1989; study strongly advocates fielding of the COLT capability using platoon forward observer parties as force structure billpayers. Due to the failure to gain the Infantry Branch's concurrence, the proposal was referred for additional analysis-the status quo remained.
7. Chief, Warfighter Division, Fire Support and Combined Arms Operations Department, USAFAS response to "Field HMMWV Based COLTs NOW! proposal appearing in June 1992 FA Journal exemplifies the establishment's reluctance to change even in the face of overwhelming justification to do so. Avoidance of doing battle with the Infantry Branch appears to take precedence over achieving warfighting capability. 
